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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This matter involves a final decision and order of the Industrial Commission 
denying a petition for Workers' Compensation Benefits. As a result, this court has jurisdiction 
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(a) (Supp. 1995). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
The issue raised in this appeal arose out of the Industrial Commission's denial of 
Workers' Compensation benefits to the petitioner Lisa Kunz. The Industrial Commission's 
action was precipitated by a hearing before an administrative law judge (R. 473), as well as 
briefing to the Industrial Commission (R.504). Both the Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law 
of the ALJ and the Industrial Commission Order are attached as Addenda 1 and 2. Petitioner's 
Petition for Review is attached as Addendum 3. Accordingly, this issue has been preserved for 
appeal. 
Issue presented: Whether the petitioner was injured in the scope and course of her 
employment. 
Standard of Review: Whether the petitioner was injured in the scope and course of 
her employment presents a question of law which, absent a grant of discretion, must be reviewed 
for correctness. Morton International, Inc. v. State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581, 588 (Utah 
1991); Walls v. Industrial Commission, 857 P.2d 964, 966 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). In Stokes v. 
Industrial Commission, 832 P.2d 56 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), this court refused to grant the 
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Commission discretion to interpret the Workers' Compensation Act. Id. at 58. Therefore, this 
court should review for correctness the Commission's determination that petitioner was not 
acting in the scope and course of her employment at the time of accident. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES 
This matter involves the interpretation of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, 
specifically Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1994) which provides: 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured, and the dependents 
of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the course 
of his employment, whenever such injury occurred, if the accident was not 
purposefully inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on account of 
the injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital services and 
medicines, and in case of death, such amount of funeral expenses, as provided in 
this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and payment of medical, 
nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral expenses provided under 
this chapter shall be on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on the 
employee. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 6, 1994, petitioner was going to work and parked her car near a 
stairwell entrance in the building occupied by her employer R.R. Donnelley & Sons (Donnelley). 
(R. 637). The parking lot was not owned by Donnelley, nor was the petitioner told where to 
park. (R. 638). The petitioner understood there was just one door in the building to access 
Donnelley. (R. 638). Donnelley shares the building with other business which are not affiliated 
with Donnelley. (R. 638). As the petitioner was accessing the building, she ascended stairs and 
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got almost to the third step when she slipped and fell. (R. 637, 641). Ms. Kunz testified that she 
slipped on ice which was covered by snow. (R. 667). Her right knee hit the stairs fairly hard and 
the petitioner testified at the administrative hearing that her knee cap was off to one side. (R. 
642). The administrative law judge below, as well as the Industrial Commission (the 
Commission) found that the evidence showed that the petitioner did have a fall, and that she did 
have a scrape on her right leg on the date alleged. (R. 474,505) Surgery was performed and 
work time was lost. (R. 645, 648-49). As the administrative law judge and the Commission's 
conclusion was that the accident at issue did not arise out of and in the course of petitioner's 
employment, the particulars concerning her injury and the benefits she seeks are not at issue on 
this appeal. 
The evidence before the administrative law judge and the Industrial Commission 
was that it had been snowing the night before the accident. (R. 637). The sidewalk had been 
partially cleared so that one could gain access to the staircase, however, some areas were not 
cleared. (R. 639). The petitioner testified, and both parties admit that other than the stairs, one 
can access the only door to the building via the handicap ramp. (R. 639). In order to take the 
ramp, the petitioner would have had to walk 20 feet farther. (R. 639-40). Petitioner testified that 
the area around the ramp was not cleared, nor was the ramp itself cleared of snow. (R. 640). 
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Petitioner testified that using the stairs was the regular route taken by the employees.1 (R. 644). 
In fact, the stairs constituted the only route Ms. Kunz and employees known to her used. (R. 
644). 
The only other witness actually called at the administrative hearing was Karen 
LaFramboise. Ms. LaFramboise is employed at Donnelley and was also in a secretarial position 
much like Ms. Kunz. (R. 749). Ms. LaFramboise testified that both the ramp and stairs had 
been used by the employees in the past, and that the area generally gets slippery with inclement 
weather. (R. 752). Ms. LaFramboise indicated that she uses the ramp "if I can get that far." (R. 
754). Ms. LaFramboise also noted: "However, Jamestown Square, when it is snowing gets up in 
the night and they start [clearing] on the walks. We have never come to work with snow not 
plowed on the walks." (R. 754). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Workers' Compensation Act of Utah covers injuries by accident which arise 
out of and in the course of employment. Normally, any injury occurring on the employer's 
premises is covered. Injuries sustained while going to or coming from the place of employment 
are generally not covered, a rule commonly referred to as the "going and coming" rule. There 
exist exceptions to the going and coming rule, one of which is the special hazards exception, 
1
 Petitioner would refer the court to three pictures showing the ramp as well as the 
entrance to the Donnelley Building. R. 407-409. One of those pictures showing the entire 
entrance is attached as Addendum 4. 
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which exception is applicable in this case. 
The special hazard exception brings an injury within the coverage of the Workers' 
Compensation Act, although the injury occurs off the employer's premises, when (1) there is a 
close association between the access way and the employer's business, usually meaning the route 
taken is the only route, or at least the normal route, employees use, (2) there is a special hazard 
associated with the route, (3) the employee is exposed to the special hazard because of the use of 
the route, and (4) the special hazard is a proximate cause of the accident. 
Comparing the present matter to the Utah Supreme Court's decision extending 
Workers' Compensation benefits in Park Utah Consolidated Mines Co. v. Industrial Comm., 103 
Utah 64, 133 P.2d 314 (1943) mandates reversal. The facts of Park Utah are not substantially 
different than the present matter. The employee in Park Utah was approaching the workplace, 
slipped and fell on ice and snow, and he could have chosen alternative routes such as stairs or an 
adjacent yard. Compensation was awarded in Park Utah and should have been awarded in this 
case. 
A review of the facts of this case and the applicable law shows that the Industrial 
Commission failed to construe the Workers' Compensation Act in favor of the employee and 
coverage under the Act. The Industrial Commission's conclusion that two distinct routes existed, 
precluding the application of the special hazard exception, was erroneous. The ramp and the 
stairs formed but a single entrance. The stairs and ramp lead to a single entrance, are contiguous 
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with a common sidewalk, and provide access from a common parking lot. 
In any event, the special hazard exception is not precluded when more than one 
route exists. The employee must only show that the route she used was the normal route. This 
the applicant did. In this case, evidence showed that the ramp had not been cleared of snow, and 
in fact access to the ramp would have been more dangerous as the sidewalk had not been cleared 
of snow where the ramp started. 
Finally, the Industrial Commission erred in concluding that snow and ice cannot 
be a special hazard. Such a conclusion is untenable when compared with the facts and holing of 
the Utah Supreme Court in Park Utah. Likewise, decisions from other jurisdictions support the 
conclusion that snow and ice constitute special hazards. The hazard need not be out of the 
ordinary. Other jurisdictions have held that snow, ice, fog, potholes, and busy intersections 
constitute hazards within the special hazard exception. 
Because the Industrial Commission failed to adhere to controlling precedent, and 
the well established law throughout the country, the order of the commission denying benefits 
must be reversed. 
6 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER FAILED TO CONSTRUE THE 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT IN FAVOR OF THE EMPLOYEE 
Section 35-1-45 of the Workers' Compensation Act (The Act) provides in part: 
Each employee . . . who is injured . . . by accident arising out of and in the course 
of his [or her] employment, whenever such injury occurred, if the accident was 
not purposefully inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on 
account of the injury . . . and such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital 
services and medicines . . . as provided in this chapter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1994). 
It is considered well settled in the State of Utah that, "Traveling to and from work 
is not part of the employment and is not covered by Workmen's Compensation.". Lundberg v. 
Cream of Weber/Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 16, 465 P.2d 175, 176 (1970). This is 
commonly called the "coming and going rule." There are numerous exceptions to the coming 
and going rule. When one of those exceptions applies, then the injury sustained off the premises 
of the employer is covered. For example, an injury suffered by an employee traveling to or from 
work is compensable if the employee is on a special errand for the employer. State Tax 
Commission v. Industrial Commission, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984). 
The Workers' Compensation Act is basically no-fault in nature, and therefore it is 
not inconsistent with the Act to hold an employer responsible for an accident on a sidewalk he 
does not own. The employer's liability has nothing to do with fault; instead, liability is based 
upon the employment relationship. 
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The Utah Supreme Court in State Tax Commission v. Industrial Commission, 685 
P.2d 1051 (Utah 1984) stated: 
Our standard of review in an industrial commission case is stringent. In 
reviewing the commission's interpretations of general questions of law, we apply 
a correction of error standard, with no deference given to the expertise of the 
commission. 
Id at 1052. 
Whether or not an injury arises out of or within the scope of employment depends 
upon the particular facts of each case. Kinne v. Industrial Commission, 609 P.2d 926 (Utah 
1980). The Supreme Court of Utah has held that the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act 
is to protect employees who have sustained injuries arising out of their employment. State Tax 
Commission, 685 P.2d at 1053. "To give effect to that purpose, the act should be liberally 
construed and applied to provide coverage." Id. "Thus, as between two competing views of the 
law, "[a]ny doubt respecting the right of compensation will be resolved in favor of the injured 
employee." Barbara Drake v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 21A Utah Adv. Rep. 10 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1995)(quoting State Tax Commission, 685 P.2d at 1053). 
II. THE SPECIAL HAZARD EXCEPTION TO THE "GOING AND COMING" 
RULE IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE 
Both the administrative law judge and the Commission below erroneously 
concluded that the special hazard exceptions to the going and coming rule did not apply. These 
conclusions must be reversed because (1) the conclusion that there were two routes to the 
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business was in error, (2) the special hazard exception is not precluded when more than one 
route exists, and finally (3) snow and ice can be a special hazard. 
A. ALL FOUR ELEMENTS OF THE SPECIAL HAZARD EXCEPTION 
WERE PRESENT IN THIS CASE. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Soldier Creek Coal Co. v. Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165 
(Utah 1985) addressed the special hazards exception in Utah. The court quoted Larsen, The Law 
of Workman's Compensation, as follows: 
The commonest ground of extension [of the premises rule] is that the off premises 
point at which the injury occurs lies on the only route, or at least the normal 
route, which employees must traverse to reach the plant, and are therefore the 
special hazards of that route become the hazards of employment. 
1A Larsen, Law of Workmen's Compensation, §15.13 (1985) (emphasis added). 
To qualify for this exception four requirements must be satisfied: 
(1) There must be a close association of the access way with the 
employer's business, usually meaning that it must be the only route to the 
work place; 
(2) There must be a special hazard associated with this route; 
(3) The employee must be exposed to the special hazard because of his 
use of the route; and, 
(4) The special hazard must be a proximate cause of the accident. 
1A Larsen, supra, at §15.13(b). 
All of the above stated requirements have been satisfied in this case. There was 
really only one route to the front door. The difference between the ramp and the staircase was 
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but a minor deviation. In the era of the Americans with Disabilities Act, it should hardly be 
surprising to find buildings equipped with wheelchair ramps. Wheelchair ramps have become 
part of, not distinct from, the traditional stairway leading to a place of employment. Nonetheless, 
even if one could conclude that there are two routes, since the stairs would be the normal route 
which employees use to access the building, application of the special hazards exception is not 
precluded. The special hazard associated with this route was the ice and snow accumulation 
which the employee was exposed to specifically because of her use of this route. Finally, the 
special hazard of accumulated ice and snow was the proximate cause of the accident at issue. 
The petitioner, Ms. Kunz, had no other reason to be exposed to this special hazard but for the fact 
that she was attempting to arrive at her place of employment. 
B. THE COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION THAT TWO DISTINCT AND 
SEPARATE ROUTES EXISTED WAS ERRONEOUS. 
The administrative law judge and the Commission concluded that there were two 
routes to the Donnelley business. These routes were described as stairs or a ramp. However, as 
the court found in its finding of fact, the two routes were separated by only twenty feet. In 
actuality, the two routes are deviations of a single route; that is, the two routes are contiguous to 
a single parking lot, connected to a common sidewalk, and arrive at the same destination, the 
front door. 
The administrative law judge in fact noted: 
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The incident case can be distinguished from Park Mine because two distinct paths 
were available in the incident to the ground entrance, the disabled ramp leading to 
the level landing which was often used by the non-disabled, and steps adjacent to 
the landing. 
(R. 478). The court found it significant that the ramp had handrails which were closer together 
than the handrails on the stairs. The administrative law judge concluded: "The applicant thus 
clearly had a choice unlike the worker in Park Mine" Id. This finding is not supported by Utah 
law when the cases allowing recovery under the Workers' Compensation Act and the special 
hazards exception are reviewed. Park Utah Consolidated Mines Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
103 Utah 64, 133 P.2d 314 (1943); Bountiful Brick Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 68 
Utah 600, 251 P. 555 (Utah 1926); Cudahy Packing Co. of Nebraska v. Industrial Commission of 
Utah, 60 Utah 161, 207 P. 148 (1922). Particularly, Park Utah does not support the 
Administrative Law Judge's nor the Industrial Commission's conclusion. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in Park Utah Consolidated Mines Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 103 Utah 64, 133 P.2d 314 (1943) explored the application of the special hazards 
exception in a case involving Workers' Compensation. The applicant in Park Utah had slipped 
on a roadway leading to her place of employment. In finding that the special hazards exception 
brought this accident within the Worker's Compensation statute, the court stated: "[T]he record 
shows that the applicant and others uniformly traveled the same approximate course to enter onto 
as well as leave the property of the employer." Id. at 315. It should be noted that the Utah 
Supreme Court in Park Utah stated, not that the applicant and other employees uniformly 
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traveled the exact route, but the same approximate course. Likewise, no finding was necessary 
that all employees use the exact same path route. In this case, employees access the building 
through a single entrance and by the same proximate course. Whether the ramp or the stairs is 
taken is simply a minor deviation. Thus, the Commission should have found that the same 
circumstances arose here where the applicant was on the normal course which employees took to 
reach Donnelley's business. 
The court in Park Utah cited a decision in California where the California 
Supreme Court stated: 
The fact that an accident happens upon a public road, and the danger is one to 
which the general public is likewise exposed, however, does not preclude the 
existence of a causal relationship between the accident and the employment if the 
danger is one to which the employee, by reason of any connection with his 
employment, is subject peculiarly or to an abnormal degree. 
Id. at 316 (citing State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Industrial Accounting Commission, 105 
Cal. 28, 31, 227 P. 168 (1924)). The court in Park Utah went on to hold: "[T]he existence of the 
ice under the snow on the particular slope constituting the only practical means of entrance to 
and access from premises, including a part of the public road, was one of the hazards peculiarly 
to the employment." Id. at 317. The same can be said for the case at bar. The dangerous 
conditions which the applicant was traversing at the time of the accident were peculiar to her 
employment. She had no other reason for taking this route except for her employment. 
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A close review of the facts in the Park Utah decision show that the road where the 
employee fell was not the only route he could have taken. There were also steps which under 
normal circumstances the employee would have used, but at the time of the accident were 
blocked by snow, much like the ramp in this case. Id. at 315. As the facts determined by the 
administrative law judge in this case show, while the ramp arguably could have been used, it had 
not been cleared of snow. The petitioner testified at the administrative hearing that the sidewalk 
had not been cleared down to where the ramp started. Thus, it would have been more 
treacherous for the petitioner to attempt to gain access via the ramp. 
C. THE SPECIAL HAZARD EXCEPTION IS NOT PRECLUDED WHEN 
MORE THAN ONE ROUTE EXISTS. 
The Commission's conclusion that the special hazards exception did not apply 
because more than one route to the front door existed is likewise erroneous. As has already been 
pointed out, the claimant in Park Utah could have used a minor deviation in routes. In Park 
Utah the employer had provided a parking lot for the employees, but it was customary for the 
employees to park alongside of the shop on a public street. The fact that an entirely different 
parking lot could have been used which was designated for employees was not material to a 
determination of whether the special hazards exception applied in Park Utah and accordingly, 
the minor deviation of routes leading to a single entrance is not material as well. In addition to 
the steps in the Park Utah case, there was also a yard between the buildings and the structures. 
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The employee in Park Utah could have easily gone across the yard instead of the adjoining road. 
In any event, the court in Park Utah did not find that factual issue material or 
determinative. The court in Park Utah reviewed two of its earlier decisions, both of which had 
been reviewed by the United States Supreme Court. In Cudahy Packing Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 60 Utah 161, 207 P. 148 (1922), an employee was killed while crossing a railroad 
track 100 feet from the property line of his employer. The Industrial Commission granted an 
award and the Utah Supreme Court sustained that award. In Cudahy, the employer had 
contended that the railroad hazard was simply a hazard which any person would have to face and 
therefore was not peculiar to their employment. However, because the employee had to traverse 
the tracks to get to the plant, the court found that the hazards pertinent thereto were peculiar to 
the employment. In other words, the employee had no reason to diverse the railroad crossing 
except for his employment. 
The court in Park Utah also reviewed Bountiful Brick Co. v. Industrial 
Commission, 68 Utah 600, 251 P. 555 (1926), wherein the employees of Bountiful Brick Co. 
used an opening in the fence on the railroad right-of-way to get to work. The facts of Bountiful 
Brick show that there were other means of access to the company property, but for most 
employees, they were rather inconvenient and impractical. One day, when the employee in 
question was using this entrance, he was hit by the train and killed. The court found that the fact 
that other means of ingress existed was not material since the route used by the employees in 
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question was a normal route, and therefore the Workers' Compensation Act would cover the 
accident. 
These Utah cases indicate that under circumstances of the present case, both the 
administrative law judge and the Industrial Commission erred in concluding that because the 
employee could have used the ramp, her accident was not covered by the Workers' 
Compensation Act. Clearly under the facts found by the administrative law judge and the 
Industrial commission, the special hazards exception to the going and coming rule applied and 
compensation should have been awarded. 
Decisions of other jurisdictions support this conclusion. In ITT Continental 
Baking Co. v. Schneider, 621 P.2d 1294 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980), the employee worked at a 
bakery. The employer did not provide designated parking, so the employees parked their vehicles 
in surrounding public streets. The employer knew that the employees driving to work would 
park on the public streets or in a public parking lot located across the street from the bakery. 
Actual entrance to the bakery building was gained by walking along various sidewalks abutting 
the building to an entrance door located on only one side of the building. That entrance was the 
only means of access to the building for the employees. 
On the day in question, the employee parked his car along the sidewalk across one 
of the streets from the bakery. As the employee approached the bakery, a bakery pan truck 
owned by his employer rolled across the sidewalk into the employee's path and struck him. At 
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the time the employee was on the sidewalk continuous with the bakery, however owned by the 
City of Seattle. 
At the hearing of this matter, the employer argued that the employee's accident 
did not come under the special hazards exception because the employee could hav£v parked 
elsewhere and approach the bakery from a different direction. The court noted: "Whether the 
presence of an alternative route affects the availability of the special hazard exception would 
depend on the circumstances. Some cases stress the habitual use of one route with the 
employer's consent; others place more emphasis on the relative safety of the two routes." Id. at 
1299. There was no evidence presented in this case that the ramp was the route used by most 
employees. In fact, the petitioner testified that she and other employees regularly used the stairs. 
Even the reasonable person looking at the entrance would have to conclude that the stairs are 
obviously the intended, and most likely chosen, means of access to the building. As a result, the 
fact that the ramp existed does not preclude the application of the special hazard exception to this 
case. 
D. SNOW AND ICE ARE SPECIAL HAZARDS 
The Industrial Commission's conclusion that snow and ice cannot be a hazard 
under the special hazard exception ignores controlling Utah law. Once again, Park Utah 
specifically holds that snow and ice can constitute a hazard. The court in Park Utah held: 
[T]he existence of the ice under the snow on the particular slope constituting the 
only practical means of entrance to and access from the premises, including part 
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of the public road, was one of the hazards peculiar to the employment. 
Park Utah, 133 P.2d at 317. The Industrial Commission's conclusion that snow and ice cannot 
constitute a hazard is untenable. 
Case law from other jurisdictions supports the conclusion that common perils 
such as ice and snow can constitute a hazard under the special hazard exception. In USF&G v. 
Gagne, 174 A.2d 406 (N.H. 1961), a woman fell on an icy path which led from public streets, 
down steps, along a pathway, over railroad tracks and a canal bridge across or along a parking 
lot, and up one or more steps to the factory entrance where she worked. This was the usual and 
expected means of entry. The employee fell again as she entered the factory and under these 
circumstances the court found that falling on ice arose out of and in the course of her 
employment. The court noted that ice was the hazard at issue and 
she encountered the hazard because of her employment, and her entry to her place 
of employment was clearly an activity which was in the course of her 
employment. The place of injury was "adjacent to the [employer's] premises and 
therefore identified with the premises in the sense that the employer should have 
removed the ice" or taken other appropriate precaution. 1 Larsen, Workmen's 
Compensation, § 15.22. 
Id at 408. 
The court in GATX Tank Erection Co. v. Gnewusch, 272 S.E.2d 200 (Va. 1980) 
held that the special hazard exception refers to a danger at a particular location, but does not 
mean that risk to the employee is different from that to which the general public would be 
exposed at the same location. Id. at 204. Likewise, in Bechtel Corp. v. Winther, 556 S.W.2d 882 
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(Ark. 1977), the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed a case where an employee needed to travel 
80 miles to his workplace. In order to reach his workplace he needed to travel across a 
causeway which cut across a lake and lead to one of the two entrances at the site of his 
employment. Apparently, the employee was found drowned in the water two days later. The 
evidenced showed that on the morning of the accident, there was low hanging fog resulting in 
low visibility. The court in Winther found that the fog was a special hazard. Of course, this same 
hazard would be applicable to any person in the general public traveling on those roads at the 
same time. It should be noted that the Winther court held: "The 'special hazard' exception may 
be applied when the off premises route, while not the exclusive means of access, is the 'usual' or 
'regularly used' route." (citations omitted) Id. at 884. 
In Ehrlich v. Strawbridge & Clothier, 615 A.2d 286 (N.J. Super. A.D. 1992), an 
employee sought worker's compensation benefits for injuries she sustained when she slipped and 
fell on ice after coming down a metal staircase which went to an exterior sidewalk which she had 
to traverse before reaching a parking lot where her car was parked. The Appellate division of the 
Superior Court of New Jersey concluded that her injuries were compensable. See also, In re 
Welham, 653 P.2d 760 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982)(where employer required off-premises parking and 
most convenient other parking required walking across a railroad track, the railroad track was a 
special hazard); Mass Brothers v. Peo, 498 So.2d 657 (Fla. Ct. App. 1986)( employee caught 
heel on chalk line in parking lot and fell, which accident was covered under the special hazards 
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exception); Petroske v. Worth Avenue Burger Place, 416 So.2d 856 (Fla. Ct. App. 1982)(pothole 
in the driveway which abutted employer's business a special hazard); Goffv. Farmers Union 
Accounting Service, Inc., 241 N.W.2d 315 (Minn. 1976)(busy street between parking lot, not 
owned by employer, and place of work found to be a special hazard); Ingalls Shipbuilding Div., 
Litton Systems, Inc. v. Dependents of Shane, 480 So.2d 1117 (Miss. 1985)(dangerous 
intersection of road used by 90% of employees is a special hazard). 
Jones v. Wendy's ofTri-State Mall, 1996 WL 30239 (Del. Super. Jan. 23, 1996), 
handed down this year, parallels the present matter in many respects. The employee in Jones 
traveled by bus to her workplace and disembarked at the entrance of the Tri-State Mall. 
According to the testimony of the employee, as she crossed through the parking lot covered with 
ice and snow, and approached the walkway that surrounded her employer's restaurant, she 
slipped as she stepped up on the walkway. A co-employee testified that the claimant had 
reported falling. In reversing the Industrial Accident Board's denial of benefits, the Delaware 
court held that the special hazards exception was applicable and that the employee's accident was 
compensable. Id. at 3. The court in Jones quoted the same language that Utah's Supreme Court 
did in Soldier Creek that the special hazards exception applies where "the off-premises point at 
which the injury occur[s] lies on the only route, or at least the normal route, which employees 
must traverse to reach the plant, and that therefore the special hazards of that route become the 
hazards of the employment." Id. (quoting Quality Car Wash v. Cox, 438 A.2d 1243,1248 (Del. 
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Super. 1981), rev'don other grounds, 449 A.2d 231 (Del. 1982)). The Jones court so held 
commenting, "Due to the location of Employer's building, within the mall parking lot, in order to 
get to work, [the claimant] was forced to traverse the icy parking lot to get to work." Id. 
Likewise, Ms. Kunz had to walk upon a walkway partially cleared of snow and 
traverse steps covered with snow and ice to reach her workplace. Construing the facts in favor of 
Ms. Kunz and coverage under the Act, this court must conclude that the special hazard exception 
applies in this case. Snow, ice, fog, dangerous intersections, as well as potholes are all special 
hazards when an employee must pass over them on her way to the workplace. Given this great 
abundance of case law, and the controlling precedent of Park Utah, the Industrial Commission's 
Order must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law of the 
Administrative Law Judge and the Order entered by the Industrial Commission should be 
reversed and the matter remanded for determination in the amount of benefits to be awarded. 
DATED AND SIGNED this 12th day of February, 1996. 
DAVID N. MORTENSEN 
SHERLYNN WHITE FENSTERMAKER 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
Industrial Commission oi 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on January 
19, 1995 at 10:30 o'clock a.m., and on February 8, 
1995 at 9:00 a.m. The hearings were pursuant to 
Order and Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: The Honorable Benjamin A. Sims, Administrative Law 
Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The applicant, Lisa H. Kunz, was present and 
represented by Sherlynn Fenstermaker, Attorney at 
Law. 
The defendant employer, R. R. Donnelley & Sons, and 
its insurer, Sedgwick James of Idaho, were 
represented by Brad Betebenner, Attorney at Law. 
The applicant, Lisa H. Kunz, requests medical expenses, 
recommended medical care, temporary total disability benefits, 
temporary partial compensation, permanent partial compensation and 
travel expenses. The applicant's date of birth is October 12, 
1962. At the time of the injury her wage was $10 per hour, and she 
worked 40 hours per week. She was married and had no dependent 
children. 
The defendants asked for additional time until March 3, 1995 
in which to submit wage information. This request was granted, and 
the case was considered ready for an order on March 4, 1995. 
The applicant was hired as a personal assistant to Jack 
Hadfield and was employed by R. R. Donnelley & Sons Company 
(Donnelley). On January 6, 1994, the applicant was going to work 
and parked her car near a stairwell entrance in the building 
occupied by Donnelley. There is no specific designated parking lot 
at Donnelley. Ms. Kunz stated that parking was a "catch as catch 
can" situation. She was never told where to park. She understood 
that there was just one door in the building to access Donnelley. 
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Donnelley shares the building with other businesses which are not 
affiliated with Donnelley. 
The ground level entrance had a set of steps as well as a ramp 
for the disabled both leading to a level landing which led to the 
doorway. Exhibit J-3. The ramp for disabled persons would have 
required the applicant to walk approximately 20 - 30 feet further. 
Neither the stairs nor the disabled ramp had been completely 
cleared of snow. 
The sidewalk had been cleared in spots, but the sidewalk had 
not been cleared from it to the stairs. The applicant could have 
entered the building by using the ramp, or by using the stairway. 
She chose the latter route. Once she had entered the ground level 
entrance, she would have had to climb another set of stairs in 
order to reach the second floor where her employer and other 
employers had their offices. 
As she was ascending the ground entrance stairway of three 
steps, she got almost to the third step, and slipped and fell. Her 
right knee hit the stairs "pretty hard." 
After the fall, the applicant testified that she could not 
straighten her knee, and her knee cap was off to the side. She 
composed herself, grabbed the railing, and hopped up the stairs, 
pulling herself by the handrail. She told Carol a fellow employee 
that she had fallen. She then called the hospital emergency room, 
was told to put her knee in ice, and to see Dr. Richard Jackson on 
the very next day. She reported that she had snow and mud all over 
her and that Joannie, another employee, noticed her dishevelment. 
The evidence shows that the applicant did have a fall, and that she 
did have a scrape on her right leg on the date alleged. 
On January 12, 1994, Dr. Jackson performed surgery. He went 
into the knee to assess the damage and find out why the knee could 
not be straightened out. After the surgery, he indicated that 
future surgery was a possibility. Subsequent to the surgery, the 
applicant went through strengthening therapy. On January 20, 1994, 
she was released to start back to work on light duty. She worked 
light duty through February 2, 1994, when she had a confrontation 
with her supervisor, Karen, who said that she needed someone full 
time. At that point the applicant left work, and understood she 
was to be off work until she could come back full time. 
She then went back to work on February 15, 1994, at Jack,s 
request. Jack said he would talk to her more after her medical 
appointment on February 18, 1994. On February 18, 1994, she saw 
Dr. Jackson who told her that surgery was needed to stabilize her 
knee. Jack told her to return to work after the surgery. She had 
the surgery on September 30, 1994. Blue Cross/Blue Shield paid £or 
LISA H. KUNZ 
ORDER 
PAGE THREE 
her two surgeries. 
She claims that Dr. Jackson neither told her that she was 
released nor did he tell her that she could not go back to work. 
Subsequently she was sent a letter by Donnelley by both letter mail 
and fax saying that if she did not return to work she would be 
terminated. The evidence shows that she received the fax, but 
there is no evidence that she received the letter. The fax noted 
that she would be terminated unless she provided R.R. Donnelley 
with a medical release to work either full or light duty by March 
4, 1994. She was then terminated because neither of the employer's 
conditions were met. 
With regard to preexisting problems, the applicant had right 
knee surgery prior to this industrial incident. The right knee 
surgery was done on three occassions in the 1981 - 1984 time frame. 
She has had left knee surgeries also. She reports that she was 
very active before the slip and fall. The medical evidence shows 
that she had no significant right knee problems during the 15 years 
prior to her instant injury. She participated in hiking, horse 
back riding, and she took care of cattle, horses, and sheep. She 
says that she can no longer do those activities because of the 
current problems with the right knee. However, Dr. Jackson gave 
her only a three percent whole person impairment for the right 
knee. 
The medical evidence further shows that she was temporarily 
and totally disabled during the period January 7, 1994 through 
January 24, 1994; from January 24, 1994 she was partially disabled 
through January 31, 1994, and was able only to work one-half days; 
and from her surgery on September 30, 1994 until her release on 
October 30, 1994. There is no medical evidence to show that she 
could not have worked light duty from January 31, 1994 through 
September 29, 1994, and the fax from the employer giving her'until 
March 4, 1994 to produce a light duty work release shows that light 
duty work was available from March 4, 1994 until September 29, 
1994. 
Ms. Kunz has no current problems with her left knee. She 
reported that her husband went to Hawaii in 1994, but she was 
unable to go with him because of her problems. However, the 
evidence shows that he went to Hawaii with his male friends, and 
her failure to go was not because of her knee problems. She can 
travel because she went to Idaho with him on several occasions to 
see his sick father and travel time by car to Idaho is roughly 
comparable to travel time by air to Hawaii. 
THE "GOING AND COMING" RULE AND EXCEPTIONS TO IT: 
The employer claims that the "going and coming" rule prevents 
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it being held liable in this case. The reader will recall that 
Donnelley leases office space from Jamestown Square. Donnelley 
occupies the second floor of its building, and there are other 
occupying tenants not affiliated with Donnelley in the building. 
Donnelley does not maintain the parking lot, the sidewalks, the 
steps, or the stairwells of the Jamestown Square complex. The snow 
removal duties are performed by Jamestown Square personnel. 
There is no evidence that the applicant was performing any 
duties for her employer on her way to work. Thus, if this accident 
is compensable under the workers' compensation laws, the accident 
must "arise out of and in the course of employment." U.C.A. 
Section 35-1-45 (1988)(emphasis added). It is noted that the 
accident must meet two tests: (1) arising out of employment, and 
(2) occurring in the course of employment. Id. An injury is 
deemed to occur "in the course of employment" when it takes place 
within the time and place of the employment or while the employee 
is fulfilling a duty incidental to his or her job. See generally 
Soldier Creek Coal Co. v. Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165 (Utah 1985). Since 
the injury occurred off the premises of the employer, and before 
the time for work, the injury without an exception to the rule did 
not occur in the course of employment. The going and coming rule 
generally bars off-premises injuries to an applicant while she is 
off premises coming to her work. If the injury is compensable at 
all, it must have arisen out of the applicant's employment under 
one of the two exceptions to the going and coming rule. 
The first exception is the "premises rule," and the second 
exception is known as the "special hazards" rule. Id. at 1166. In 
general, the premises rule applies a strict property line test for 
determining when an employee qualifies for the premises exception. 
Id. at 1167. See e.g. Soldier Creek Coalr supra. In this case, 
the applicant was injured before she reached Donnelley's premises, 
and in fact was injured in a common area which was serviced by the 
Jamestown Square personnel. 
The special hazards rule is the only other exception which 
could apply in this case. Under the special hazards rule, the 
"premises" are extended because of employer site access 
considerations. In order for the special hazards exception to 
govern, there are four requirements: 
1. There must be a close association of the 
access way with the employer/s premises, 
usually meaning that it must be the only 
route to the work place; 
2. there must be a special hazard associated 
with this route; 
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3. the employee must be exposed to the special 
hazard because of his use of the route; and 
4. the special hazard must be the proximate 
cause of the accident. 
Soldier Creek Coal, supra. at 1166 citing 1 A. Larsen, The Lav of 
Workmen's Compensation. Section 15.13 (1985). 
"Special hazard" implies something in addition to or in excess 
of that which is normally encountered in the activities associated 
with daily living. The result might be different if the employee 
had only one route to the doorway. Under U.C.A. Section 35-1-45 
(1988), no special hazard has been shown, and the requirements of 
the going and coming rule have not been met. Since ice and snow 
are not special hazards to Utahns in January, there was no special 
hazard that was the proximate cause of the accident. 
The applicant cites the case of Park Utah Consolidated Mines 
Co. v. Ind. Comm'n. 133 P. 2d 314 (Utah 1943) (Park Mine) to support 
her case. In Park Mine, the facts were as noted by the Supreme 
Court: 
Applicant had finished his shift, changed clothing and 
was on his way to the parked automobile of co-worker 
with whom he rode to and from work. The surface struc-
tures of the employer's property are built in the shape 
of the letter 'U', with the open side facing a narrow 
oiled road, which is maintained by the county. The 
yard formed by the buildings and the road is about fif-
ty feet square. Applicant crossed the yard and stepped 
over the edge of the property line into the road. He 
reached a point approximately two paces beyond the pro-
perty line when he slipped on the ice and snow, fell to 
the ground and broke his ankle. At the point of the 
fall, the road slopes downhill in the direction appli-
cant was walking at about a three per cent fall. That 
yard and road were covered by a fresh fall of snow a-
bout eight inches in depth. The car, which was appli-
cants objective, was parked on the road opposite the 
shop, and about fifty feet down the road from the point 
of the accident. Although the employer had provided a 
parking lot about five hundred feet lower down the road, 
it was customary for employees to park along the side of 
the shop. The employer apparently consented to this ar-
rangement . 
* * * 
[T]he record shows that the applicant and others unifoijm-
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ly traveled the same approximate course to enter onto as 
well as to leave the property of the employer. There 
were steps from the roadway to the shop, but they were 
blocked at the time by snow piled up against them. There 
was no practical means of access to or from the Park Utah 
Consolidated Mines Company property, other than the ad-
joining road and the yard between the buildings and 
structures. 
Id. at 314-315. 
In. Park Mine, the Court concluded that the worker had "only 
one means of exit from the premises, although it [was] true that 
the yard sloping down to the public road measure[d] approximately 
50 feet in width. The applicant could not leave the premises from 
the steps to the shop for the reason they were blocked by snow.11 
Id. at 317. It is clear from this discussion that had the steps 
been open, the result might have been different. 
The instant case can be distinguished from Park Mine because 
two distinct paths were available in the instant case to the ground 
entrance, the disabled ramp leading to a level landing which was 
often used by the nondisabled, and steps adjacent to the landing. 
The steps had handrails which were so widely spaced that only one 
handrail could have been held by a person climbing the steps. In 
addition, the steps presented angular concrete hazards due to the 
juncture of the vertical and horizontal planes. It was on one of 
these angular steps that Ms. Kunz injured her right knee. 
The disabled ramp would have been safer under the facts as 
presented here because it had been constructed for disabled persons 
to use, had no steps, was on a gradual incline, had handrails 36 
inches apart, and did not accumulate ice to the extent normally 
found on the steps. The ramp was within 30 feet of the'other 
stepped pathway which was not far from the path selected. In any 
event, it was a different path composed of a variety of features 
not wholly similar to those of the stepped path. The applicant 
thus clearly had a choice unlike the worker in Park Mine. Accord, 
Seabreeze Indus., Inc. v. Philv, 118 So. 2d 54 (Fla. App. 1960), 
cert, den., 122 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 1960). 
In Park Mine, the Court determined that the available pathway 
to the employer's entrance was 50 feet in width, and that there was 
no discernible difference between any two portions of the pathway. 
In essence, the Court found that a safer pathway could not be 
found. Under such a circumstance, the Park Mine defendant could 
not argue that if the applicant had chosen a path 20 feet more 
distant from that selected, the applicant might not have been 
injured. The Court was saying that the applicant had no clear 
choice of routes which were different in terms of components «or 
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risks, and that all routes available were similar. 
Under the facts of the instant case, there are no applicable 
exceptions to the going and coming rule, and no liability can be 
awarded under the workers' compensation laws, and U.C.A. Sections 
35-1-1 et sea. against the employer. There might be some 
negligence on the part of responsible parties for failure to remove 
ice and snow from the steps on which the applicant allegedly 
slipped. However, such a finding is beyond the purview of the 
Commission, and since workers' compensation is not available to the 
applicant in this case, she should be free to file a claim based on 
tort for her injuries. 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the claim for workers7 compensation 
benefits filed by Lisa H. Kunz for injuries to her right knee 
received on January 6, 1994, in an accident in a common area not 
controlled by the employer, R.R. Donnelley and Sons, when she was 
not on the employer's premises while she was coming to work, and 
was not performing any duty for the employer, be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is 
timely filed, the parties shall have fifteen (15) days from the 
date of filing with the Commission, in which to file a written 
response with the Commission in accordance with Section 63-46b-
12(2), Utah Code Annotated. 
Dated this & - day of 1995. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Jlltrs 
s t r a t i v e Law Judge 
MAILING of Findings, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
I certify that I have mailed the attached document in the 
case of LISA H KUNZ, Case No. 94757, to the following parties by 
first class prepaid postage on the ]M day of Apr 95. 
LISA H KUNZ 
624 SOUTH 100 EAST 
SPRINGVILL UT 84663-2223 
SHERLYNN W FENSTERMAKER, Atty, 
48 N UNIVERSITY AVE PO BOX 672 
PROVO UT 84603 
BRAD BETEBENNER, Atty, 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
LISA KUNZ, * 
* ORDER DENYING 
Applicant, * MOTION FOR REVIEW 
vs. * 
* 
R. R. DONNELLEY & SONS CO. * 
and SEDGWICK JAMES OF IDAHO# * Case No. 94-0757 
Defendants. * 
Lisa Kunz asks The Industrial Commission of Utah to review the 
Administrative Law Judgefs decision denying her claim for benefits 
under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over 
this motion for review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-82,53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
ISSUE UNDER REVIEW 
Did Ms. Kunz' injury arise out of and in the course of her 
employment at R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co. ("Donnelley" hereafter) . 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The underlying facts of this matter are not in dispute and can 
be summarized as follows: 
At the time of her accident, Ms. Kunz was employed by 
Donnelley in Provo, Utah. She reported for work each day between 
8 a.m. and 8:30 a.m, at an office leased by Donnelley in a multi-
tenant office building in Provo, Utah. 
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As a general mile, workers' injuries that occur off the 
employment premises while traveling to and from work are not 
considered to arise out of and in the course of employment and are 
not compensable under the Act. However, Ms. Kunz argues that her 
injuries resulted from a special hazard in the route she was 
obliged to take to get to her employer's office. 
In Soldier Creek Coal Co. V. Bailey
 r 709 P. 2d 1165 (Utah 
1985), the Utah Supreme Court recognized the "special hazards" 
exception to the going and coming rule and identified the four 
elements that define a special hazard: 
. . • (1) There must be a close association of the access 
way with the employer's premises, usually meaning that it 
must be the only route to the workplace; (2) there must 
be a special hazard associated with this route;(3) the 
employee must be exposed to the special hazard because of 
his use of the route; and (4) the special hazard must be 
the proximate cause of the accident. 
The ALJ ruled that the circumstances of Ms. Kunz' accident did 
not satisfy either the first or the second element of the foregoing 
test. The Industrial Commission agrees with the ALJ's conclusions 
for the reasons set forth below. 
Li Close association of access wav with the employer's premises. 
The ALJ concluded that Ms. Kunz did not meet the first element 
of the special hazards rule because two routes were available to 
the work site; the stairs or the nearby ramp. Professor Larson 
provides the following discussion regarding this point: 
If an alternate route is available, and if it is 
substantially more remote or more inconvenient, or not 
safer, the special hazard exception to the premises rule 
will usually be applied. Conversely, if a reasonably 
safe and convenient route is available, and if the 
employee chooses a substantially more dangerous route, 
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the exception will not be applied. Larson's Workmen's 
Compensation Law. Vol, 1, §15.13(g); p. 4-54,55. 
The record in this case establishes that Ms. Kunz could have 
taken the ramp to travel to her work site. Had she done so, she 
would have had the benefit of adequate handrails and a more level 
surface. Under the conditions present on January 6, 1994, such an 
alternate route was substantially safer than the stairs, while not 
significantly inconvenient. Consequently, Ms. Kunz has not met the 
first element of the special hazards rule. 
X L There must be a special hazard associated with this route. 
The second element of the special hazards exception requires 
that Ms. Kunz demonstrate that there was, in fact, some "special 
hazard" associated with her route to work. The ALJ concluded that 
the risk presented by ice and snow in northern Utah in January is 
not a special hazard, but is a common fact of life. 
The Industrial Commission agrees with the ALJ's conclusion on 
this point. There is no evidence that the condition at the site of 
Ms. Kunz' accident was any different than conditions elsewhere in 
Provo. Snow had recently fallen, with the natural result that 
outdoor sidewalks, stairs and ramps were slick. Everyone moving 
about in the area faced the same conditions as those which caused 
Ms. Kunz to fall. The Industrial Commission finds no_ basis to 
characterize such general conditions as a "special hazard" of Ms. 
Kunz' employment. 
Ill, Summary, 
In order to qualify for workers compensation benefits under 
the special hazard rule, Ms. Kunz must prove each of the four 
elements of the rule. Ms. Kunz has failed to establish either the 
first or the second elements of the rule. Consequently, the 
Industrial Commission concludes that Ms. Kunz7 accident on January 
6, 1994 did not arise out of and in the course of her employment at 
Donnelley and is not compensable under the Utah Workers' 
Compensation Act. 




The Industrial Commission hereby affirms the decision of the 
ALJ and denies Ms. Kunz' motion for review. It is so ordered. 
Dated this / / day of September, 1995. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this order by 
filing a request for reconsideration with the Industrial Commission 
within 20 days of the date of this order. Alternatively, any party 
may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a 
petition for review with that court within 30 days of the date of 
this order. 
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R.R. DONNELLEY & SONS CO. and 
SEDGWICK JAMES OF IDAHO, and 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
Respondents• 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF REVIEW 
Case No. 94-0757 
Petitioner, Lisa Kunz, by and through her counsel 
Sherlynn White Fenstermaker, petitions the Utah Court of Appeals 
for a Writ of Review directing the respondent Industrial Commission 
of Utah to certify its entire record, which shall include all the 
proceedings and evidence taken in this matter to this court. 
This petition seeks to review the entire order of the 
Industrial Commission denying petitioners Motion for a Review 
dated September 19, 1995, as well as the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order of the Honorable Benjamin A. Sims, 
Administrative Law Judge dated April 14, 1995, copies of which are 
hereto attached. 
I^d DATED and SIGNED this n day of October, 1995 
CTE FEN5TEI SHEKLYNNprttlT  5TERMAKER 
DAVID N.\MiRTENSEN 
Attorneys^cor Pet i t ioner 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Petition for Writ of Review with postage prepaid 
thereon this day of October, 1995, to the following: 
Brad Betebenner 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
50 South Main, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
The Utah Industrial Commission 
160 East 300 South, 3rd Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6615 
Secretary 
9542J68 
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